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There have been recent moves to include Public Access Defibrillation (PAD) in emergency 
response strategies. The value of this development is explored in this article. The benefits and 
limitations of extending Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) use to non-traditional first 
responders, minimally trained witnesses and citizens are examined and the cost-effectiveness 
of such developments is discussed. The authors contend that, at the present time, enthusiasm 
for PAD would seem misplaced and that there is a series of economic, ethical and legal 
uncertainties that need to be addressed before widespread distribution of AED technology 
should be pursued.  
Introduction 
Over the past 30 years, mortality rates for most 
cardiovascular diseases have declined significantly 
in industrialised societies. The major exception to 
this is sudden cardiac death, which for many 
patients is the first manifestation of underlying 
cardiac disease. Unfortunately, the majority of these 
sudden cardiac deaths occur not in tertiary health 
care institutions but in the community. This is 
believed to be a major contributor to the poor 
survival rates following out-of-hospital 
cardiorespiratory arrest, estimated to be 5 to 10 per 
cent in adults.1 
A number of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 
strategies have been proposed that would improve 
 
1
 W D Weaver, “Resuscitation Outside the Hospital – What’s 
Lacking?” (1991) 325 NEJM 1437. 
the outcome of resuscitation following out-of-
hospital cardiac arrest, including community-wide 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) programs and 
the integration of Automatic External Defibrillators 
(AEDs) into the EMS “chain of survival”. The 
“chain of survival” is a metaphor that describes the 
various interdependent interventions that must be 
achieved in sequence to ensure survival following 
out-of-hospital cardiorespiratory arrest. These links 
include: 
1. an enhanced emergency notification and 
dispatch system;  
2. a community-based CPR training program so 
that bystanders will be able to provide CPR; 
3. a first-responder system whereby bystanders, 
police etc, can provide early defibrillation;  
4. advanced life-support providers such as 
paramedics; and  
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5. a hospital-based service with critical-care 
expertise. 
In recent years recognition that the “chain of 
survival” is only as strong as its weakest link has led 
a number of commentators to call for the provision 
of AEDs for use by first responders to improve 
survival following “pre-hospital” arrest. 
The rationale for the use of AEDs is based upon 
the proposition that, as time to defibrillation has 
been shown to be the major positive predictor of 
outcome in adults2 following cardiorespiratory 
arrest, reducing the time to defibrillation should 
significantly improve outcome. On this basis it has 
been suggested that AEDs should be available for 
use in hospitals by “traditional” first responders 
such as medical and/or nursing staff,3 or as part of a 
Public Access Defibrillation (PAD) system whereby 
AEDs may be available for use by “non-traditional” 
first responders such as emergency service 
personnel, by families of high-risk patients or by 
minimally trained members of the general public at 
work sites, entertainment venues or public places 
such as airports and shopping centres. Support for 
Public Access Defibrillation has increased 
significantly in recent years following rapid 
developments in AED technology and as a 
consequence of studies from the United States that 
suggest that, where EMS response is rapid, the use 
of AEDs may increase survival from 2 to 30 per 
cent.4 
While AED use may justifiably be extended to 
non-traditional first responders and perhaps to 
selected members of the public in specific contexts, 
extension of intervention of electrical defibrillation 
to minimally trained (or completely untrained) 
members of the public raises important ethical and 
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legal questions. As a proposed public health 
measure, it must be shown to be epidemiologically 
sound, and to take into account all possible hidden 
costs and burdens. 
PAD as a public health measure 
The claim that the introduction of Public Access 
Defibrillation and the dissemination of AEDs will 
inevitably reduce mortality from out-of-hospital 
cardiac arrest is not necessarily correct. For PAD to 
lead to a successful outcome,  
• the arrest must be witnessed;  
• the bystander must be prepared to apply the 
defibrillator;  
• the AED must be immediately available, well-
maintained and functional;  
• the device must be applied rapidly and correctly; 
•  the bystander/first responder must be trained in 
the use of AEDs;  
• the patient’s rhythm must be ventricular 
fibrillation or ventricular tachycardia;  
• the post-shock rhythm must perfuse the patient; 
and  
• the patient must not suffer from any morbidity 
known to be associated with minimal survival 
following cardiorespiratory arrest, such as 
terminal malignancy, pneumonia or renal 
failure. 
At each of these steps issues arise that may 
ameliorate any benefit that accrues from Public 
Access Defibrillation. Although data regarding out-
of-hospital arrests vary widely between studies, in 
general it seems that only 40 to 60 per cent of 
arrests are witnessed.5 The unwitnessed arrests 
would, of course, not benefit from PAD. In addition, 
over 80 per cent of out-of-hospital cardiac arrests 
occur in the home,6 generally beyond the reach of 
PAD. United States estimates suggest that only 12 
per cent of public places could realistically be 
covered by readily available defibrillators. Of those 
that are witnessed, bystander CPR occurs in 10 to 
50 per cent of occasions.7 Importantly, despite the 
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fact that CPR has been taught to hundreds of 
thousands of citizens worldwide since the 1980s, 
available data suggest that very few individuals 
have benefited and that there remains considerable 
reluctance, on the part of both health professionals 
and members of the public, to perform mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation and CPR.8 In addition, of those 
who experience out-of-hospital cardiac arrest 
(OOHCA), 40 to 80 per cent of adults and less than 
25 per cent of children are in ventricular fibrillation 
or ventricular tachycardia and are likely to respond 
to defibrillation.9 Indeed, the outcome of OOHCA is 
extremely poor in children, with high rates of 
mortality and neurological morbidity. This is largely 
because, in contrast to adults in whom a cardiac 
dysrhythmia is often the precipitating event in an 
arrest, children usually have an arrest secondary to 
hypoxia,10 and as such are unlikely to respond to 
defibrillation. 
This combination of factors, that is,  
• that only half of all arrests are witnessed;  
• that bystander CPR is performed in only half of 
those cases where cardiac arrest is witnessed, 
suggesting that bystanders may also be 
unprepared to utilise an AED; 
•  that of these less than half are likely to respond 
to defibrillation; 
•  that many will experience significant adverse 
effects from resuscitation; and  
• that long-term survival in the few survivors may 
be as little as 10 per cent,11  
suggests that it is misleading to think that the 
dissemination of AEDs will benefit all of those who 
                                                                                     
443. 
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are victims of out-of-hospital cardiac arrest or that 
PAD is a worthwhile public health measure. 
Arguments in support of the cost-effectiveness of 
PAD are generally based on assertions that they 
work, appear to be safe and at $A2,000 to $7,000 
per unit they seem relatively inexpensive. In many 
ways, however, the direct costs of PAD are of 
considerably less significance than the indirect and 
intangible costs and do not account for the potential 
harms that may arise from PAD. The real cost of 
implementing a system of PAD includes not only 
the costs of training, education, maintenance and 
replacement but also the cost of our commitment to 
care for survivors, including those requiring ICU 
admission and those with neurological sequelae 
including global cognitive deficits and persistent 
vegetative states. Indeed, for many observers, it is 
the cost of caring for those adults and children who 
survive with neurological deficits, estimated to 
occur in 10 to 83 per cent of survivors of OOHCA,12 
that is the major barrier to implementing PAD.13 
This concern is particularly valid in relation to 
children, as studies consistently demonstrate that, of 
those who survive, virtually all will have serious 
neurological deficits and many will remain in a 
persistent vegetative state.14 The cost of caring for 
such patients, the majority of whom demonstrate 
minimal awareness after an average of four-and-a 
half years, has been estimated in one study to be 
greater than $US90,000 per year.15 In addition to the 
harm that results from surviving CPR with major 
sequelae, other potential harms to patients include 
being resuscitated when this is not in accordance 
with the patient’s wishes, and the psychological 
harm that patients may experience when their loved 
ones are trained in the skills of CPR and 
defibrillation.16 
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Some attempts have been made to calculate the 
cost-effectiveness of PAD by lay responders. For 
example, a recent study by Nichol et al,17 calculated 
a median incremental cost of $US44,000 per 
additional quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) (IQR 
$29,000 to $68,000). Unfortunately, many of these 
calculations are based on a series of questionable 
assumptions including: 
• that implementation of PAD would not change 
the costs of treatment of sudden cardiac arrest;  
• that a PAD device would be available for each 
cardiac arrest that occurred in public; and  
• that training and maintenance costs would only 
be equivalent to 10 per cent of the total device 
cost.  
Unsurprisingly, other estimates of the cost-
effectiveness of PAD place the cost per QALY as 
high as $US225,892 ($US406,605 per life saved).18 
Given that, based on United States estimates, the 
introduction of PAD may save less than a score of 
Australian lives each year, the cost per QALY may 
be greater than $A100,00 per QALY. 
Such estimates inevitably raise questions 
regarding the “opportunity costs” of introducing 
PAD. Opportunity cost refers to the notion that, by 
choosing to allocate resources to PAD, one is 
choosing not to allocate resources to other areas of 
need, such as Aboriginal health care or primary 
prevention programs to decrease smoking. Indeed, 
at a time when 51 million people die annually of 
preventable diseases, the majority in developing 
countries, many observers are calling upon ethicists 
to do more than provide post hoc justifications for 
medical decisions, but instead to take a more global 
view and a more critical view of decision-making in 
health care. The issue of opportunity cost is perhaps 
the most crucial issue in medicine and yet is rarely 
made explicit. Three points are worth making: 
 
1. resources are limited and distribution decisions 
must be made; 
2. resource allocation decisions should be made 
on the best available evidence; and  
3. demonstrating efficacy is not sufficient and 
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Care Med 2046. 
comparative distribution issues such as equity, 
social justice and cost-analysis must be 
addressed.  
In this light it is worth noting that there are no 
Australian data providing a cost-utility analysis of 
PAD. 
Public education or medical mis-
information 
The issue of community participation in PAD 
also raises questions regarding the adequacy of 
information in public health and patient education 
programs. In recent years reviews of patient 
information resources have found that the benefits 
of interventions are frequently emphasised and the 
risks, side-effects and medical uncertainties either 
ignored or glossed over.19 Indeed, it must be asked 
whether, in the enthusiastic rush to promulgate 
public awareness of and skills in CPR over the past 
20 years, the public has ever been adequately 
informed of the true success rates, complications 
and morbidity associated with CPR and/or 
alternatives to CPR such as the “right of refusal”. 
That this has been the case suggests that 
• the level of disclosure is tailored to CPR as an 
“emergency intervention”;  
• the right to express preferences regarding CPR 
has not really been adequately addressed;  
• the ethics of public health education and 
behaviour modification have not been well 
explored; and 
• medicine has implicitly adopted a position 
whereby the public has received “selective” 
education in order to simplify the health 
message and maximise the “public good”. 
It is doubtful whether this degree of education will 
be sufficient if AEDs are to become widely 
distributed in the future as part of an integrated 
PAD system. 
Unwelcome resuscitation: Advance 
directives and the right to refuse 
Prior to the development of CPR in the early 
1960s, almost all patients died following 
cardiopulmonary arrest. Following the development 
 
19
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Cancer and Benefits of Screening are Communicated to Women: 
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of CPR, it rapidly came to be applied to all those 
who experienced a cardiorespiratory arrest. Right of 
refusal was not seen as an issue because consent 
was regarded as implied under the emergency 
exception to the doctrine of informed consent.20 
Over the past 20 years, however, a number of 
factors have led to the development of Do Not 
Resuscitate (DNR) policies. These have included:  
• recognition of the poor overall success rate of 
CPR and the limited possibility of survival in 
patients with pre-existing co-morbidity;  
• changes in the health care professional-patient 
relationship with greater emphasis on patient 
autonomy; and 
• consistent evidence that patients wish to be 
involved in CPR decision-making and that, 
when informed, they frequently choose not to 
be resuscitated. 
Most health care institutions now have DNR or No-
CPR policies21 which recognise the right of 
competent patients, in ethics and in law, to 
participate in medical decision-making and to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment, including resuscitation.22 
This right to refuse resuscitation is, however, lost 
once one steps outside the hospital and, perhaps 
ironically, the rights of patients to refuse unwanted 
medical interventions are much better protected in 
hospitals than in the community.23 Many observers 
question whether this should be the case or whether 
EMS systems, particularly if they incorporate PAD, 
should recognise the right of individuals to refuse 
resuscitation in both the inpatient and the outpatient 
setting.24  
If CPR and/or defibrillation is to be withheld on 
the basis of patient choice, the practical issue may 
then be how emergency personnel can best be made 
aware of patients’ deliberated wishes in a manner 
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Ethics Journal 13. 
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K S Keuhl, S Shapiro and K N Sivasubramanian, “Should a 
School Honor a Student’s DNR Order?” (1992) 2 (1) Kennedy 
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that is efficient and credible, that does not risk 
public expectations of the EMS system, and that 
allows maintenance of the practical and symbolic 
value of resuscitation.25 Decisions not to resuscitate 
are complex decisions of great moral and legal 
import and the unpredictability and urgency 
associated with out-of-hospital cardiac arrests do 
not provide sufficient time for determination of 
complex questions regarding a patient’s diagnosis, 
prognosis or wishes. Withholding CPR on the basis 
of arbitrary grounds or “first impressions”, justified 
by a nebulous understanding of respect for 
autonomy, is not appropriate and runs counter to the 
entire moral and practical basis of EMS systems. 
For these reasons, in recent years there has been 
considerable interest in developing mechanisms by 
which requests not to be resuscitated, recognised as 
medically and ethically acceptable by numerous 
institutions and medical colleges, can be honoured 
in the pre-hospital setting.26 
Most efforts towards reducing inappropriate pre-
hospital CPR have concentrated on enhancing pre-
arrest decision-making about CPR and the use of 
“portable” pre-hospital DNR orders.27 Indeed, these 
have become law in a number of States in the 
United States and health policy in others. Other 
proposals have included computer-based medical 
registries with DNR orders linked to emergency 
calls and DNR identification bracelets or necklaces. 
Unfortunately, all of these suggestions raise 
considerable medical, moral, legal and logistic 
problems regarding documentation, availability, 
identification, inadvertent harm and legal liability. 
For, once “000” is dialled and an emergency call 
activated, the ethical presumption in favour of 
saving life and the contextual characteristics of out-
of-hospital cardiac arrests make it extremely 
 
25
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Emergency Medicine 1383. 
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 American College of Emergency Physicians, “Guidelines for 
‘Do Not Resuscitate’ Orders in the Prehospital Setting” (1988) 
17 Ann Int Med 1383; G A Sachs, S H Miles and R A Levin, 
“Limiting Resuscitation: Emerging Policy in the Emergency 
Medical System” (1991) 114 Ann Int Med 151. 
27
 S H Miles, “Advance Directives to Limit Treatment: The Need 
for Portability” (1987) 35 J Am Geriatr Soc 76; K M McIntyre, 
“Loosening Criteria for Withholding Prehospital 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation” (1993) 153 Arch Intern Med 
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difficult to prevent the application of acute care. 
Whilst we may decide that at the current time 
refusal of CPR in the pre-hospital setting presents 
too many difficulties to be incorporated successfully 
into PAD systems, we cannot ignore the issues of 
rights of refusal and advance directives. The conflict 
that arises between public policy and individual 
freedom will inevitably need to be addressed as we 
consider the wisdom of PAD. As Gillon has noted: 
“[V]aluing life … does not confer a general right 
on others to impose life-saving interventions 
upon a person against that person’s deliberated 
choice to the contrary.”28 
Unwilling resuscitators: Potential harm 
to users of AEDs 
 In addition to the potential harm to recipients of 
PAD, there are also potential harms to users. These 
include the risk of electrocution, the guilt or anxiety 
that may result from the expectation to perform 
CPR (particularly relevant where AEDs are made 
available for the families of high-risk patients) and 
the psychological stress associated with performing 
CPR. Indeed, given that ambulance services and 
hospitals provide education and training as well as 
psychological and welfare support to those 
providing resuscitation, there would seem to be a 
strong ethical justification for providing adequate 
training, counselling and debriefing for all those 
bystanders/first responders who perform CPR in the 
community. The risk of physical harm to users 
would appear to be very small. However, both 
“user” problems (such as failure to stand back when 
defibrillating), and “device” problems (such as 
device shutdown, analysis or algorithm failure, 
inappropriate application of electrodes and 
inadequate device maintenance) have been 
reported.29 While proponents of PAD assert its 
safety and ease of use, reports that trained health 
professionals have poor defibrillation skills and do 
not use defibrillators safely raise doubts about such 
claims.30 Proponents of PAD at times also seem not 
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30
 J M Fielden and N S Bradbury, “Observational Study of 
Defibrillation in Theatre” (1999) 318 BMJ 232. 
to appreciate that citizens may not share the health 
community’s enthusiasm for PAD. Research 
suggests that many members of the public do not 
wish to provide resuscitation and may not 
appreciate being coerced into providing a 
“community service”. While the question of 
whether there is any obligation on citizens to 
provide CPR/defibrillation is primarily a legal one, 
where an expectation is created that the public must 
participate in PAD, this also becomes a moral 
question. While most advocates of PAD accept that 
participation by citizens is not obligatory, some 
appear not to share this belief: 
“The public at large, including family members 
and bystander witnesses of cardiac arrest, must 
be expected to participate in this optimal 
response capacity.” 31 
“”
42 
Resource allocation: Influences on the 
introduction of biomedical technology 
Many forces may drive the development of new 
technologies in medicine, forces that certainly come 
into question with regard to AEDs but that must be 
addressed with any emerging technology. This 
arises in part because of the complex nature of the 
health system and in part because of the difficulties 
associated with community involvement in resource 
allocation. At the current time there is little real 
involvement of consumers in decision-making, 
despite the fact that there is a general consensus 
both that communities should be better informed 
and that they should have some involvement in 
decision-making. Unfortunately, community 
demand is extremely difficult to assess and the 
mechanism by which consumers should be involved 
remains unclear, despite exciting “post-Oregon” 
innovations being made in The Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Sweden. 
Whilst resource-allocation is increasingly 
expected to be “evidence-based”,32 other forces may 
influence decision-making, such as commercial, 
 
31
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New Horiz 153. 
32
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political and professional self-interest and the 
“technological imperative”. 
The “technological imperative” is a term used to 
describe the process within medicine that gives 
primacy to interventions based on doing whatever is 
possible. It reflects optimism in medical technology 
and in the hopes of achieving an “outcome”. It may 
be manifest both in the requests/desires of patients 
or the community and in the decisions of doctors, 
and may drive medicine to “do something” – to 
introduce technologies that may not significantly 
benefit patients or may actually harm them. The 
technological imperative is undoubtedly a major 
force in medicine although one that may be 
expected to diminish in significance as decision-
making becomes more transparent. 
Decision-making may also be influenced by 
commercial factors, a fact often not recognised by 
health care professionals at either the individual or 
institutional level. The development of any medical 
technology or pharmaceutical agent requires a 
considerable degree of co-operation among 
manufacturers, health administrators and clinicians. 
The concern that many share is that whilst there are 
clear benefits from this liaison, the link between 
health care and industry is extremely ill-defined. As 
such, the primary ethical commitment to care for the 
patient and for the community may at times be 
subverted by the need of companies to recover costs 
and generate a profit. Although this issue is not 
limited to PAD, the development of AEDs provides 
a striking example of the extent and potential 
influence of commercial interests on medicine. 
Conferences, symposia and publications are heavily 
sponsored by manufacturers of resuscitation 
equipment both in Australia and the United States.33 
With dramatic personal anecdotes and photographs 
of survivors, they make impressive promotional 
material but could hardly be called evidence-based. 
This does not suggest that all links with industry 
should be prohibited, but that there should be 
recognition of the impact of commerce on decision-
making and the need both for evidence and for a 
point of separation between industry and the health 
profession. 
Legal responsibility and the use of PAD 
A number of legal issues are raised by the use of 
PAD. They may need to be considered by 
 
33
 (1996) 7 (2) Currents in Emergency Cardiac Care 2.  
regulatory authorities before there is widespread 
placement of the devices. The use of a medical 
device (such as a defibrillator) by a non-medical 
person may be regulated by State legislation. Thus 
in some jurisdictions the use of a defibrillator may 
be a controlled medical act34 and so medical 
practice legislation may need to be amended to 
allow for the use of AEDs by non-medical persons. 
Also, when advertising is used to promote public 
awareness on the use of such devices, consideration 
needs to be given to the effect of legislation dealing 
with misleading and deceptive conduct (such as in 
the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) or Fair Trading 
legislation in the States), given the likelihood of 
actually saving a life (as outlined above). 
One significant legal issue raised by the use of 
PAD concerns the civil liability of AED users. It is 
well recognised that a stranger (not being a medical 
practitioner, or perhaps other registered health 
professional35) need not stop to give assistance to a 
person who appears to be having a cardiac arrest. 
When, however, the stranger stops and decides to 
render assistance, the question of the appropriate 
standard of care may arise. 
Where a person undertakes a task that would 
normally call for special training and experience, 
then that person must not only exercise reasonable 
care (the usual standard of care) but must also 
measure up to the level of proficiency that is 
expected of a person trained and skilled in the 
task.36 Thus a person who was to use a device that 
would require medical or other specialised training 
may be judged against the professional standard. 
For example, an ambulance officer, trained in the 
use of defibrillators, would be judged against the 
standard of a reasonably skill and trained ambulance 
officer.  
The law does, however, take note of “all the 
circumstances of the case”, including special 
circumstances. Thus Jones has commented:37 
“In an emergency it may well be reasonable for a 
practitioner inexperienced in a particular 
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treatment to intervene, or indeed for someone 
lacking medical qualifications to undertake some 
form of treatment. For example, a bystander who 
renders assistance at a road accident does not 
necessarily hold himself out as qualified to do so. 
He would be expected to achieve only the 
standard that could reasonably be expected in the 
circumstances, which would probably be very 
low. This approach is clearly born of the 
emergency since, if there was no urgency, this 
unqualified person who undertook treatment 
beyond his competence would be held to the 
standard of a reasonably competent and 
experienced practitioner. For example, a person 
who holds himself out as trained in first-aid must 
conform to the standards of ‘the ordinary skilled 
first-aider exercising and professing to have that 
special skill of a first-aider’.” 
Because of doubts about standards of care in 
emergencies, a number of jurisdictions (notably in 
the United States)38 have enacted “Good Samaritan” 
legislation that indemnifies from liability persons 
who, in good faith, render assistance in accident or 
emergency circumstances. In Queensland the 
Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 (Qld) offers 
some protection to registered doctors and nurses 
who render assistance in an emergency situation.39 
The 1995 Review of Professional Indemnity 
Arrangements for Health Care Professionals also 
recommended that such legislation should be 
introduced by other States in Australia.40 
A trained “first responder” such as an ambulance 
or police officer, when using a defibrillator, would 
be expected to exercise the expected level of skill of 
a trained operator. But what of a lay (untrained) 
member of the public who in an emergency decided 
to use an available AED? What standard of care 
would then be expected? It could be argued that an 
untrained person who used an AED would be 
judged against the standard expected of a trained 
user. A reasonable person would not be expected to 
use such a device as he or she would need to be 
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aware of the parameter of uses for such devices and 
potential harms. The risks associated with 
indiscriminate use of AED would outweigh the 
advantages that may accrue from accidental 
“correct” use of the device by an untrained member 
of the public. The first response of a member of the 
public who is untrained in CPR or the use of AED 
should be to call for assistance from appropriately 
trained emergency personnel. Any use of a device 
could only be justified by considering the risks 
associated with its use against the benefits that may 
reasonably accrue from its use.41 
A duty of care is also owed by organisations or 
persons (such as building owners and event 
organisers) who provide AEDs on their premises. 
Their standard of care would include an obligation 
to maintain their AEDs and keep them in good 
working condition. This may involve regular 
checking and maintenance of the devices. The more 
common the devices become (as advocated by 
proponents of AEDs), the more likely the public 
would be to rely upon their availability. 
Having identified that there may be significant 
legal questions on liability posed by the use of PAD, 
calls have been made for a legislative response to 
clarify these issues. Most States in the United States 
were expected to have passed laws by 1999 limiting 
the liability of users of AEDs.42 
The American Heart Association has released a 
model for State legislation regulating AEDs. This 
model legislation provides, amongst other things, 
that the device must: 
• have FDA approval; 
• be able to detect the presence or absence of 
ventricular fibrillation or rapid ventricular 
tachycardia and be capable of determining 
(without the intervention of an operator) 
whether defibrillation should be performed; and 
• automatically charge and request delivery of an 
electrical impulse (when appropriate). 
It also provides that any person or organisation 
that acquires an AED must: 
• provide training for expected users; 
• ensure that the defibrillators are appropriately 
maintained and tested; 
• involve a licensed physician or medical authority 
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to ensure compliance with the requirements for 
training, notification and maintenance; and 
• ensure that any person who uses the AED 
activates the EMS system as soon as possible 
and reports the use of the AED. 
The model legislation then provides limited 
liability protection:  
“[A]ny person or entity, who in good faith 
renders emergency care or treatment by the use 
of an AED shall be immune from civil liability 
for any personal injury as a result of such care or 
treatment, or as a result of any act or failure to 
act in providing or arranging further medical 
treatment, where the person acts as an ordinary, 
reasonably prudent person would have acted 
under the same or similar circumstances and does 
not amount to wilful or wanton misconduct or 
gross negligence.” 
Thus the standard of care to avoid liability is that 
of the “ordinary, reasonably prudent person”. The 
limitation of liability extends to any person who 
uses the AED and is not limited to those who have 
been trained in its use. This seems to go beyond 
what is necessary. Would an ordinary, reasonably 
prudent person be expected to use a device in which 
they have not been trained? There is also concern 
that the limitation extends to omissions to seek 
further medical treatment. 
Of those American States that have introduced 
limited liability legislation for the use of AEDs, 
most do not extend the immunity to untrained, lay 
users, only to “properly trained users”.43 A Bill 
(Cardiac Arrest Survival Act 1999)44 currently 
before the 106th Congress would provide for the 
amendment of the Public Health Service Act45 to 
provide for the placement of AEDs in federal 
buildings and establish protection from civil liability 
arising from the use of the devices. The Act (if 
passed in the current form of the Bill) would 
provide an immunity for  
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“any person who provides emergency medical 
care through the use of an automated external 
defibrillator ... from civil liability for any 
personal injury or wrongful death resulting from 
the provision of such care [providing there was 
no] gross negligence or wilful or wanton 
misconduct”.  
This federal legislation thus goes further in 
providing immunity for lay users than most of the 
State legislation. 
Conclusion 
In our enthusiasm to strengthen the “chain of 
survival” we must not lose sight of the fact that a 
series of economic, ethical and legal uncertainties 
needs to be addressed before widespread 
distribution of AED technology is pursued. 
Discussions of PAD have generally considered 
four levels of defibrillation:  
• level one: traditional first-responder 
defibrillation; 
• level two: non-traditional first-responder 
defibrillation; 
• level three: citizen CPR defibrillation; and  
• level four: minimally trained witness 
defibrillation.46 
While strong arguments may be made for support 
for levels one, two and, perhaps, three PAD,47 the 
problems raised by level four PAD make it difficult 
to justify. 
At the current time our understanding of many of 
the issues is made more difficult by the relative lack 
of data. More research is clearly needed to 
demonstrate the utility and cost-effectiveness of 
PAD systems in the relevant setting. Clinical 
anecdotes, physiological data and extrapolation 
from small studies in select populations, such as in 
airline passengers, are insufficient to justify the 
incorporation of AEDs into the EMS system and do 
not satisfy the requirements for “evidence-based” 
resource allocation. 
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